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Immigration to Japan from the LDP and Beyond
Glenda S. Roberts†
In recent years up to today, various inuential voices in Japan have proposed that the country open 
itself to immigration, in one form or another, as a partial solution to revitalize the economy, to prop up 
the demographic decline, and in recognition of already present streams of migration who entered 
through “side” or “back” doors.1 Where will Japan go from here? is paper traces connections among 
developments in migration policy in recent years by way of examining relevant discourses on migration 
from government policy reports, interviews with bureaucrats, politicians and civil society organization 
representatives and other stakeholders. While pro-immigration voices are present, the prospect for any 
“opening up” of Japan remains murky, due in no small part to the failures evident in various policies up 
to now as well as to the economic recessions of the past two decades, exacerbated by the disastrous earth-
quake and nuclear accident of 3/11. e “I” word remains contested.
1.　Introduction
At a conference at Meiji Gakuin University in 1995, a bureaucrat from the Ministry of Foreign Af-
fairs (MOFA) commented that Japan has no immigrants, only entrants. is statement pretty much 
sums up Japan’s immigration policy in the postwar period. Although a number of side-door policies 
have allowed foreigners to enter in various categories, there has never been a policy to encourage the 
long-term settlement and integration of foreigners as immigrants. Indeed, as Kiriro Morita and Toshio 
Iyotani argued in 1994, unlike advanced nations in Europe in the post-war period, Japan did not expe-
rience a labor shortage in building up her economy because she used the excess labor from those Japa-
nese citizens repatriated from the colonies, as well as from her own countryside. e zainichi Korean 
and Taiwanese populations also provided labor.2 Yet by the mid-80s, when Japan was experiencing her 
own economic bubble, labor was becoming scarce, particularly in “3D” (dicult, dangerous, dirty) 
jobs. rough various side-door policies (acceptance of people of Japanese descent on long-term visas 
accommodated by the 1990 revision of the Immigration Control Act; use of the “entertainer” visa to ll 
labor demand in the water trades3; trainee and technical intern programs which functioned as de facto 
 † Professor, Waseda University Graduate School of Asia-Pacic Studies
e author would like to thank the journal Asien: e German Journal on Contemporary Asia, which published an earlier ver-
sion of this paper (Nr. 124/Juli 2012).
 1 Many scholars have pointed to government policies that have brought new immigration to Japan’s door while not really open-
ing the “front” gate. See, for instance, Kondo (2005) and Vogt (2007).
 2 e term zainichi refers to Koreans and Chinese (and their descendants) who lost Japanese nationality in 1952 aer the San 
Francisco Peace Treaty was signed, yet who remained living in Japan.
 3 In Japanese, “mizu shōbai” (water trades) refers to night-life industries such as bars, pubs, clubs, etc. ere was a demand for 
foreign female workers in this industry both as singers and dancers, and as bar hostesses, as Japanese women’s labor participa-
tion rates in this industry fell with Japan’s growing auence in the 1980s (Douglass 2003).
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guest worker programs), as well as through the overstaying of tourist visas, foreigners came in increas-
ing numbers to live and work and marry in Japan, in many cases bringing their families with them, or 
making new families subsequently. Despite the decade of recession following the burst of Japan’s hous-
ing market bubble in 1991, and the more recent scal crises following the US sub-prime loan bubble 
debacle of 2008 (referred to in Japan as the “Lehman Shock”), many of these people have stayed and 
more continue to arrive, although there have been slight decreases in their number due to the nancial 
crises as well as the Great East Japan Earthquake and nuclear disaster of 2011. One of the consequenc-
es of the reality of a burgeoning foreigner population without national governmental policy and ade-
quate scal support for the infrastructure of a multicultural society has been gaps and inconsistencies 
in the provision of social welfare, education, medical treatment, housing and so on, for these residents. 
e brunt of the work of integrating foreign residents into the society has fallen to local governments 
and civil society organizations, who, without sucient resources, could only make piecemeal albeit 
valiant eorts (Tsuda 2006).
A repercussion of the failure to create a comprehensive policy is that some of the newcomer popula-
tion has been rendered vulnerable, and a very small number have turned to crime. e crime rate of 
the foreign population is continually sensationalized in the media, with even the crime of overstaying 
considered as heinous and threatening to the social order. e ubiquitous government campaigns to 
crack down on undocumented foreigners have fuelled this sensationalization. is, I would argue, has 
created an unease and even fear in the general public over the issue of opening the country to further 
migration. Yet fears from another direction̶the fear of the consequences of the rapidly aging, low-
birthrate society̶are now propelling some academics and politicians to advocate a genuine opening 
of the society to immigrants in the near future. But I get ahead of myself. Let me rst give an overview 
of the current trends in residency of foreigners in Japan.
e year 2008 saw the largest number of foreigners ever register as residents in Japan, the rst year 
to top the two million mark, at 2,217,426 people. is number dropped by 31,305 registrants in 2009 
due to the poor economy aer the Lehman Shock.4 ere was another major drop in foreign regis-
trants aer the Great East Japan Earthquake of March 2011 and nuclear disaster following. e popu-
lation of foreign registrants in September 2011 stood at 2,088,872 (MOJ 2012). e majority of foreign 
residents currently come from China (32.3 percent), North and South Korea (26.4 percent), Brazil 
(10.3 percent), the Philippines (10 percent) and Peru (2.6 percent). Although foreign residents can be 
found all over the country, in both rural and urban areas, their heaviest concentration is in Tokyo, fol-
lowed by Osaka, Aichi, Kanagawa, Saitama, Chiba, Hyōgo and Shizuoka prefectures (MOJ 2011). Of 
the total number of residents in 2011 (2,088,872), some 1,105,964 are temporary, while 982,908 are 
permanent residents, and 392,831 are zainichi special permanent residents (MOJ 2011). In 2011, regis-
4 According to Yoshihisa Morimoto of the Bank of Japan (2012: 2), due to the fall in demand from the U.S. and Europe aer the 
global nancial crisis brought on by the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, “[…] real GDP in Japan recorded a decline of more 
than 10 percent on an annualized basis̶a larger drop than that in the United States̶for two consecutive quarters from the 
October‒December quarter of 2008.”
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tered foreign residents made up about 1.7 percent of Japan’s population of 126.5 million people. While 
1.7 percent may seem inconsequential compared to the proportions of foreign residents in the rest of 
the developed world, to the Japanese, it is apparent and a cause for comment. It should be noted, how-
ever, that many of the people included as “foreign residents” in the statistics are Japan-born, even now 
into the fourth generation in the case of the zainichi population, the “special permanent residents” who 
make up almost 19 percent of all registered foreigners, but Japan’s citizenship principle is based on jus 
sanguinis rather than jus soli (Kashiwazaki 1998).
2.　Population Decline and Response
In 2000, a United Nations report suggested that in order for Japan to maintain its population in the 
face of the coming population decline, it would need to accept about 381,000 foreign migrants annual-
ly, and if Japan desired to keep the size of the working-age population constant at the 1995 level 
(87.2 million), Japan would need to allow 609,000 migrants to enter per year to 2050. In this latter sce-
nario, the report notes, “e number of post-1995 immigrants and their descendants would be 46 mil-
lion, accounting for 30 percent of the total population in 2050” (UNPD 2000: 49‒51). At the time, this 
declaration made big headlines and indeed, it has reverberated in academic writings as well as policy 
documents. While the projection by the United Nations report may have been a kind of unwelcome 
wake-up call, it certainly was not taken as a serious policy direction. ere is a range of opinion among 
academics, as well as amongst economic federations, civil society organizations, and government min-
istries, as to how the immigration framework should be changed. None of the above parties look to 
immigration as the main solution to the problem of the low birth rate. On the other hand, no one is 
calling for a cessation to migration. Parties dier as to what sort of migrant workers should be encour-
aged to come to Japan, in what sort of occupations, and under what kind of conditions.
In an earlier paper written in 2007, I reviewed how the prospect of increased immigration has been 
portrayed in writings by academics as well as by politicians and bureaucrats (Roberts 2008). At the 
time, no organization was advocating for substantially increased levels of immigration aimed at the 
long-term stay and integration of foreigners into Japanese society. Indeed, the level being discussed by 
government ocials was a maximum cap of three percent of the population. Over the past few years, 
the government has stepped up its policy initiatives on the low birth-rate society, through eorts, for 
example, to make child-rearing more compatible with work. ere is also discussion of pushing back 
the retirement age and encouraging senior citizens to remain active in the labor force. Furthermore, 
house helper humanoid robots are being developed to make up for a lack of red-blooded care givers 
(Coulmas 2007; Robertson 2008). Only very rarely is immigration ever mentioned as a possible strate-
gy to assist in the transition to a much lower population level. Newcomer foreign populations are re-
ferred to as “foreign workers,” not as immigrants.
It is in this context that it is highly interesting that the leading business newspaper, the Nihon Keizai 
Shimbun, on September 28, 2009, issued a long editorial entitled “Population Crises Questions Nation-
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al Strategy: Immigration Policy Inescapable” in which the editor-in-chief called for a strategic plan on 
migration:
is is a theme we must consider for a national strategic plan: how can we raise the current 
1.7 percent share of foreigners in the population? We must not forget that it is a reality we can 
no longer postpone deliberating. e age when we will face shortages in the elds of medi-
cine and caregiving, agriculture, industry, and R&D is right before our eyes. (Hirata 
2009/09/28)
e demographic problem that the Nihon Keizai Shimbun refers to is that Japan had the highest life 
expectancy at birth (81.9 years) and the oldest population in the world in 2005 (Goodman and Harper 
2007). Given the low birthrate, demographers predict that by 2025, almost thirty percent of the popu-
lation will be over sixty-ve, and only two people between ages 15 to 64 will support each person age 
65 or over (currently about three workers support every retiree). According to Vaclav Smil (2007: 4), 
the greatest problem is not the loss of 25 or 35 million people by 2050, but this fact of an unprecedent-
ed aging of the population, wherein Japan could have “nearly ve million people in their 90s and […] 
more than half a million of centenarians.” Naturally, not all of these elder citizens will be healthy and 
autonomous, so the strain on public health, not to mention pension issues, will be very large indeed.
e Nihon Keizai Shimbun in 2009 suggested that a strategic plan for immigration be formulated 
and put in place under the newly formed National Strategy Division (Kokka Senryaku Kyoku under the 
leadership of Naoto Kan, DPJ, Prime Minister of Japan in 2010/2011), but as of 2009 they saw no evi-
dence in the Democratic Party’s (DPJ) Manifesto of such a vision nor had they heard of it from any of 
the members of the Cabinet. e Nihon Keizai Shimbun mentioned the plan of Hidenori Sakanaka, 
former Ministry of Justice (MOJ) bureaucrat, as one with potential. I will refer to this shortly.
3.　Nikkei Brazilians and Peruvians: Recent Trends
Were it not for the global economic downturn of 2008, Japan may have been further along the way 
towards an ocial immigration policy by now. e global economic downturn of 2008 has severely af-
fected Japan’s industries, with auto and auto-parts related industries especially hard-hit. As the majori-
ty of nikkeijin5 are employed in this industry, they have suered extensive lay-os. Over 50 percent of 
those employed in manufacturing were laid o, according to the Nihon Keizai Shimbun (2009/10/19).
Because housing is oen tied to one’s employment through company welfare, people also became 
homeless or had trouble paying rent. Much of the private educational structure in international 
schools some of the children had enjoyed was also dismantled, as parents, unable to aord tuitions, 
5 e term nikkeijin refers to persons of Japanese ancestry who are welcomed back to Japan with facilitated entry and working 
regulations.
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withdrew their children. Many children subsequently were le with no place in any education system.6
On January 9, 2009, under the Tarō Asō Cabinet, the “Council for the Promotion of Measures for 
Foreign Residents” was established to deal mainly with the problems that nikkeijin residents were fac-
ing in the global economic crisis (this council was placed into the Cabinet Oce for Policies on a Co-
hesive (kyōsei) Society, alongside myriad other social issues of work-life balance, food education, traf-
c safety, barrier-free policy, youth development, low birth rate, victims of crime, the aging society, 
suicide prevention, international exchange, and policies for the disabled). In April 2009, the Council 
came up with a support measures plan to assist nikkeijin in education (including enrolment of children 
in public schools and language support), employment assistance and vocational training (particularly 
for care giving and language skills), housing, and voluntary repatriation (CPMFR 2009). By July 16, 
2009, nationwide 7,491 people had applied for nancial assistance in returning home (Chūbu Yomiuri 
Shimbun 2009/07/27). At rst, the voluntary repatriation assistance stipulated that those repatriating 
with the assistance could never return to Japan in the future on long-term visas. Aer receiving public 
criticism, however, this was revised in May 2009 to a three-year waiting period before possible re-
entrance on the long-term visa (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2009/05/23). By the program’s end on March 
31, 2010, 21,675 nikkei Brazilians (92.5 percent), Peruvians (4.2 percent) and others (3.3 percent) had 
repatriated under this scheme (MHLW 2011). 2009 residence gures show a decrease in the numbers 
of foreign nationals from Brazil by 49,511 people, or a 15.6 percent decrease from 2008 leaving the 
2009 total of 267,456 (MOJ 2011). Many of those who remained were out of work due to the sudden 
decline of the auto and auto-parts related industries.
4.　Recent Policy Change in the ICRRA
On July 15, 2009, the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act (ICRRA, Shutsunyūkoku 
kanri oyobi nanmin nintei-hō) was amended, and I will note some of the changes here. e main thrust 
is a new system of residency management for foreigners whereby the MOJ is the sole agency tracking 
foreigners’ residency, immigration status and employment status. Previously these functions were 
shared by the MOJ and the local governments, but the new system houses all functions under one roof 
and creates a new biometric “residency card” for all foreigners on stays of over three months except 
special permanent residents. e government claims this will make it easier to provide social welfare 
to foreign residents, but civil society organizations have criticized it as being a violation of privacy and 
a means to make the lives of undocumented people even more precarious. Other features of the 
amended ICRRA are that the much-maligned trainee system has been revised to allow coverage of the 
Labor Standards Act (Rōdō kijun-hō) to all trainees and technical interns throughout the three years of 
their stay, and the Minimum Wage Law (Saitei chingin-hō) shall now cover technical interns. I should 
6 at is, lack of Japanese skills prevented some children from thriving in Japanese schools, especially those children who had 
been attending private ethnic schools in their native languages but who had to withdraw due to their parent’s tightened eco-
nomic straits aer the Lehman Shock. See Matsumoto Masami (2011).
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note, however, that advocacy groups still object to the system as it is still called a “trainee program” 
while in fact it is a guest labor program, as well as because these workers have no freedom to change 
employers (MOJ 2009).7
5.　Economic Partnership Agreements and Migration Policy: Signicant Change?
Another new development in recent years has been the arrival in Japan of Indonesians and Filipinos 
to work in nursing and care giving on-the-job training programs under Economic Partnership Agree-
ments (EPA). e EPA with Indonesia, part of which allows for bringing in workers for employment in 
nursing and care-giving sectors, came into force on 1 July, 2008 (Stott 2008). e Philippines ratied 
their EPA with Japan on 10 September, 2008 (Ager 2008/10/09). In the rst two years of the agree-
ments, from each country up to 400 people aiming to be nurses and 600 aiming to be care givers were 
to come to Japan. In both agreements, nurses were given six months of Japanese language training. 
ey may stay up to three years total. Care-giving candidates also experience the six months of lan-
guage training, and then enter their workplaces for four years, aer which they may take the national 
examination for care givers. e hurdle for both groups is to take the national care-giving or nurse ex-
amination in Japanese. If they do not pass, they must return home. As of August 2010, 370 nurses and 
510 care givers from the two nations had been conditionally accepted (Yomiuri Shimbun 2010/08/25). 
e public reception of the Indonesian nurses and care givers has been fairly positive. I have seen sev-
eral television programs showing them at work, and popular news magazines such as Wedge (2009: 
28‒36) also portray them as hard-working and well-trained. Wedge reported that the Kashiwa Tanaka 
Hospital in Chiba translated the national nursing exam into English and had the Indonesian nurses 
take it. Except for a section testing them on knowledge of the Japanese social welfare system, almost all 
the nurses scored 80 percent or above on the test. Rie Kada, the deputy board chair of this hospital 
noted that if they put Japanese alphabet (rubi) over the Chinese characters in the test, foreign nurses 
would have no trouble in passing it. In 2010, three nurses (two Indonesians and one Filipina) out of 
254 from the Philippines and Indonesia who took the national nursing exam passed it. e Yomiuri 
Shimbun noted that facilities that accepted these nurses were given a very high burden of educating 
them suciently to pass the test in Japanese, and that the number of facilities willing to accept these 
workers is declining as both facilities and candidates are victims of this ill-conceived plan (Yomiuri 
Shimbun 2010/03/27).
While one might think that this is the trial stage of a large program to bring in workers for the un-
der-staed care sector, which is likely to be faced with severe shortages of labor under rapid demo-
graphic decline, for the time being the government insists this is merely an international exchange, not 
an expansion of the foreign worker labor market. Hence comes the nearly impossible hurdle of passing 
7 Ippei Torii, head of the Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan and Secretary General of the Zentōitsu Workers Union, in a 
talk given at the Graduate School of Asia Pacic Studies, Waseda University on February 4, 2011, noted his dissatisfaction that 
these programs continue to exist under the front (tatemae) of training programs when they are in fact guest worker programs 
on the cheap.
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the respective national exams in Japanese if these workers are to remain as nurses or care givers. ere 
is a history to this, pointing to dierent stances that respective ministries take over the issue of foreign 
labor importation, with Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI) and MOFA relatively pro-
immigration, and Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare (MHLW), as well as the Japanese Nursing 
Association, quite the opposite (Roberts 2008). Indeed, when I interviewed MHLW ocials in May of 
2006, one ocial expressed quite starkly negative sentiments in regard to bringing in foreign care giv-
ers and nurses unless they were totally uent in the Japanese language. He remarked that Japan has to 
think about whether or not to open migration further. He noted all the problems the EU has had with 
migration recently̶France’s riots, Germany, the UK. He voiced an anxiety about public safety in 
Japan, and mentioned the trial of a nikkei Peruvian man who was arrested for murdering a little boy. 
Public safety is bad, he said, and there are many education problems with nikkeijin, problems with the 
lack of health insurance, and with gangs, that is, how do you prevent gangs from forming when you 
have kids dropping out at elementary school? He also said these things cost money.
Where would the budget come from to solve such problems? e interesting thing to me about this 
exchange was that the problems he noted have been caused by the dearth of government policy in re-
gard to nikkeijin. Had there been sound policy to support the economic, social, linguistic and educa-
tional lives of nikkeijin from the beginning, such problems would surely have been reduced. Further-
more, throughout the interview, the ocial exhibited a great reluctance toward the notion of adjusting 
the work content in nursing homes and hospitals so that foreign care givers might t in more easily.
Nurses and care givers from those EPA agreements are now indeed working in Japan, and the media 
are oering sympathetic portrayals of these workers that also indicate anxiety that Japan will be criti-
cized for having accepted them under false pretenses. A 2010 editorial in the Asahi Shimbun 
(2010/08/25) noted,
While singing a song of having an interchange of skilled, talented personnel, in actual fact, 
isn’t this the same as bringing people in on a limited basis and then sending them packing? 
e world is going to surely doubt whether Japan really wanted these people in the rst place.
It might be that the public sympathy garnered for them will be enough to change the examination 
language requirement, in which case we will have seen the rst opening of a door to the immigration 
of skilled nurses and care workers. In a recent paper, Gabriele Vogt (2009) analyses the EPA as “an in-
visible policy shi” toward international health-care migration to Japan. Indeed this was conrmed in 
an interview I held in February 2010 with an ocial of the Ministry of Justice.
In the most recent news on the EPA nurses and care givers, nurses have made gains in passing the 
exam, but the percentage passing is still low. Of the 415 nurses taking the national exam in February 
2012, 47 people (11.3 percent) passed. is is compared to the 90.1 percent passing rate of Japanese 
exam takers (Asahi Shimbun 2012/3/27). Of the 94 EPA care givers taking the care-giving exam aer 
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three years of on-the-job training, 38 percent passed (36 people) as compared to a pass rate of 64 per-
cent among Japanese exam takers (Asahi Shimbun 2012/03/30). From 2013, the Minister of Health, La-
bour and Welfare (since 2011) Yoko Komiyama told the Press, the nursing exam will have pronuncia-
tion guides in Japanese alphabet for all Japanese kanji characters (the past test had these guides only 
for those characters deemed the most dicult), and they will also extend the time, but they will not al-
low the test to be taken in English. Furthermore, those foreigners who failed the care-givers examina-
tion will be allowed to extend their stay in the country for one more year rather than being sent home, 
if they fulll certain conditions (Asahi Shimbun 2012/03/23). Hirofumi Noguchi and Keishi Takahashi 
(2012/03/30) noted in the Yomiuri Shimbun, however, that less than y percent of those nurses who 
failed yet were given the opportunity to stay on longer, agreed to do so. In fact, because nursing facili-
ties have had diculties in training the EPA candidates to pass the exams, as the years go by, fewer fa-
cilities are accepting these candidates. Nevertheless, Japan has entered a new EPA to bring in care giv-
ers and nurses from Vietnam, and ailand and India are in the ong. If an additional 900,000 
nursing care workers are really needed by 2025 as is claimed by them in the Yomiuri Shimbun article, 
one wonders how this goal will be met.
6.　Multicultural Coexistence (Tabunka kyōsei)
As we have established to this point, Japan up to the present has no ocial immigration policy, al-
though there are numerous ways by which people have entered the country, stayed long-term, become 
permanent residents, or naturalized. Since Japan is not ocially a country of immigration, we might 
suppose that it lacks policies and legal frameworks for the inclusion of residents who are not 
Japanese̶aer all, the nation is not actively attempting to integrate foreigners nor is it encouraging 
them to settle, as we have seen in the previous examples of nikkei Brazilians and EPA care givers and 
nurses. ere is also no legal framework, such as Korea has, to forbid discrimination on the basis of 
race or ethnicity. Yet in fact, there is a kind of policy geared toward assisting foreigners to live in their 
locales. Not surprisingly, it did not begin as a policy of the central government, since the central gov-
ernment has not been actively pursuing immigration. It began rather at the local level, in Kawasaki 
City in the early 1990s, born out of the interaction between Kawasaki and its large community of 
zainichi, and was termed tabunka kyōsei, or Multicultural Coexistence. e concept was taken up sub-
sequently in the mid-1990s by a group helping foreigners who had fallen victim to the Hanshin Awaji 
Earthquake, and by 2004 the concept and centers to support foreign residents had sprung up in Osaka, 
Hyōgo, Kyoto, Hiroshima and Tokyo (Yamashita 2010: 331).
Yamashita rightly asks the question, “Is tabunka kyōsei Japan’s version of multiculturalism?” e re-
sounding reply, not only from Yamashita but also from others (see, for instance, Iwabuchi 2010) is 
“no.” e central government (Coordination Agency) did go on to co-opt the terminology of multicul-
tural coexistence in June of 2005 when it established a research group entitled “Research Group to En-
courage Multicultural Coexistence” and further when that group published a report the following year 
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in March, entitled “Report on the Research Group to Encourage Multicultural Coexistence̶Toward 
Encouraging Multicultural Coexistence in the Local Communities.” As Yamashita reports, the term 
then became ocial, and was disseminated to locales nationwide. e report dened multicultural co-
existence as “Where people of diering nationalities or ethnicities, etc., live together as constituent 
members of local society while forging equal relationships as they recognize each other’s cultural dif-
ferences.” Yamashita sees nothing wrong per se in this denition, but he does point out a few areas for 
consideration. e rst is the emphasis on “local society.” He notes that the reason “local society” is 
used is that the Japanese Constitution gives rights only to Japanese nationals and omits mention of for-
eigners, but the mandate of the Local Autonomy Law (Chihō jichitai-hō) is to ensure the safety, health 
and welfare of the “residents,” foreign residents included. Hence through its wording, Yamashita notes 
that the central government is clearly and cleverly “passing the buck” (marunage) to the local govern-
ments. Secondly, Yamashita analyzes a pamphlet on Multicultural Coexistence published by the Tokyo 
municipal government. In this pamphlet, he notes, “foreigners” are set against “we Japanese.” “We Japa-
nese” are assumed to be of the same nationality and ethnicity, whereas “foreigners” are dierentiated, 
with their cultural and other diversity something to be recognized. ere is no sense here that “for-
eigners” might become Japanese nationals, no complicating the term “Japanese.” Lastly, he points out 
that the “culture” in this cultural recognition is essentialist, and that it goes no further than the level of 
the “3 F:” Fashion, Festivals, and Food (Yamashita 2010: 332), or what he notes Tessa Morris-Suzuki in 
2002 refered to as “cosmetic multiculturalism.” Yamashita (2010: 332) concludes, “From the beginning, 
the Japanese State does not even have an immigration policy, and only positions the foreigners who 
come into the country from the standpoint of immigration control. So in that sense, one cannot call 
Multicultural Coexistence ‘Multiculturalism.’” And in that sense, multicultural coexistence is at pres-
ent only a local piece-meal initiative, not a policy with a strong scal backbone from the central gov-
ernment that would provide substantial resources (for instance, Japanese as second language (JSL) and 
adult education programs, and curriculum content recognizing diversity in society). is is not to crit-
icize those local governments who actually are carrying out some mutually benecial projects aiming 
to incorporate all the residents in their locales; Yamashita as well as others (Yamawaki 2012/02/01) 
give examples of programs in Japan that go way beyond seeing “foreigners” in terms of the “3 F” alone. 
ere is only so much that locales can do without strong initiatives and funding from the central gov-
ernment, however (see also Tsuda 2006). Scholar and activist Keizō Yamawaki (2012/02/01), in a re-
cent opinion piece, noted that while the central government has been very slow in social integration 
projects for the foreign resident population, local governments have been instrumental in actively pur-
suing policies to welcome the diversity that a foreign population brings.
It is at this juncture that it is interesting to analyze how national policy makers or lobbyists approach 
the topic of immigration. Who is arguing for it, where do they situate the necessity for it, how do they 
argue for it, what kind of immigration is it that they seek, and what kind of society do they see result-
ing from it?
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7.　 Recent Policy Statements from Inuential Stakeholders, Opinion Leaders, and Political 
Parties
7.1　LDP
In 2008, inside its Division of National Strategy, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) had formed a 
Project Team of 23 members, entitled “e Road to a Japanese-style Immigration Nation.” On June 20, 
2008, it produced a report entitled “Opening the Country to Human Resources! e Road to a Japa-
nese-style Immigration Nation: Towards Building a Country where [People] Yearn to Immigrate” 
(NIKMPC 2008). In the document, they aim for a society in y years where ten percent of the popu-
lation will be immigrants, and they stated they would announce this worldwide within one year. As 
categories of migrants they list the highly skilled and skilled laborers who have trained in Japan, stu-
dents, families of immigrants (with family integration rights guaranteed), those requiring humanitari-
an consideration (refugees, returnees from North Korea with Japanese wives, and others) and inves-
tors. ey suggest introducing a point system to make immigration a fair and clearly understood 
process. e strategy is too dense to note in detail, but it incorporates plans to develop immigrants 
through language education and other training, and to foster social integration for multicultural coex-
istence policy. ey advocate establishing an “Immigration Agency” (Iminchō) with its own govern-
mental minister. Moreover, in the cabinet, they would within one year establish a “Foreign Human Re-
source Strategy Division.” Furthermore, within three years they suggest setting up multicultural 
coexistence education in elementary and junior high schools to foster correct views of foreigners in Ja-
pan’s youth (NIKMPC 2008: 8). Opportunities to learn about multicultural coexistence would also be 
made available in adult education classes, and community activities would be set up promoting coexis-
tence with foreigners through cultural exchange. Furthermore, an “Anti-Ethnicity Discrimination 
Law” would be passed.
is plan obviously died on the vine, since the LDP lost the election in September 2009. Yet the fact 
that none of the grand designs had been implemented by that time leads one to suspect that not all the 
LDP felt the time was ripe̶especially given the poor economic outlook in 2008. Nevertheless, surely 
the fact that the LDP formed this team who came up with such a bold plan is signicant.
What is remarkable about this plan is that it is not merely a bid for highly skilled labor but also al-
lows for family reunication, and that it seeks to give newcomers the necessary language and other 
training to adjust to life in Japan, while expediting the process to full citizenship, without discrimina-
tion. Furthermore, it is situated in an awareness that anti-ethnicity discrimination laws would have to 
be passed, and that the Japanese populace would need to be educated toward acceptance of these new 
members of the nation. is proposal is quite revolutionary, and indeed it proved to be extremely un-
popular in some circles. e Honorable Hidenao Nakagawa, the LDP House member who brought the 
initiative to then Prime Minister (holding oce from 2007‒2008) Yasuo Fukuda in June 2008 received 
nasty commentary on right-wing blogs, who believed the proposal was “selling the country down the 
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river”(Nakagawa 2011/02/01).8 While apparently that and the fallout from the Lehman Shock were 
enough to keep this proposal from going anywhere, Member of Parliament (MP) Nakagawa 
(2011/02/01) still stands by it and feels that Japan needs such a plan in order to inject new vitality into 
the society as the population declines.
Given the steadfast reluctance of the Japanese government to engage actively in front-door immigra-
tion, how did this plan get as far as it did? e initial impetus of the Plan, according to MP Nakagawa 
(2011/02/01), was concern over the plummeting economic growth rate and concern for the shortage of 
workers in care giving. MP Nakagawa was asked by MP (House of Councillors) member Hirohiko 
Nakamura to chair the LDP Alliance of Diet Members to Promote the Exchange of Foreign Resources. 
MP Nakamura himself had experience in social welfare issues and was on the board of several social 
welfare foundations. MP Nakagawa, a proponent of trade liberalization active in economic policy, 
claimed it is also out of his concern for increasing economic growth that he advanced these proposals 
on immigration policy. In his talk at Waseda in December 2011, he remarked that Japan in the past 
twenty years has become a society that discriminates against and excludes not only migrants but wom-
en, youth, and middle-aged men. He suggested that aiming for a growth rate of four percent would en-
able all of these groups to nd decent employment. He argued that the blame for Japan’s poor perfor-
mance in the past two decades can be laid at its propensity toward valuing homogeneity, exclusivity 
and concealment, all values he suggested Japan would do better without. Furthermore, he argued that 
Japan should come up with a new public nature (kokyōsei) that displays diversity, inclusiveness and 
disclosure.
According to MP Nakagawa, the Alliance formulated their statement with considerable advice from 
Hidenori Sakanaka who established the Japan Immigration Policy Institute in 2005 aer having spent 
much of his career as a bureaucrat in the Ministry of Justice Immigration Bureau. Let us now turn to 
Sakanaka’s views.
7.2　Sakanaka Hidenori, JIPI
Sakanaka has numerous immigration-related publications to his name, and, according to Eika Tai 
(2004: 357), he has been inuential “in shaping the public discourse on a multiethnic Japan.” He is the 
author of, in 2007, Imin kokka Nippon: 1000 man nin no imin ga Nihon o sukuu (Immigration Nation 
Japan: Ten Million Immigrants Save Japan) and in 2009, Nihongata imin kokka no kōsō (Towards a 
Japanese-style Immigration Nation). As one can see from these titles, he is with the LDP project team of 
23 in his strong assertion that ten million migrants should be accepted by 2050, and that building a 
new nation with immigrants will lend vitality to Japan and create a prosperous future. In particular, he 
advocates an immigration model that takes young foreigners, trains them in Japan’s high schools and 
universities, assists them to nd work, gives them permanent residence, and makes it easier for them 
8 He stated, “Boku wa gokai da to omou kedo, iwayuru kuni wo uru teigen de aru to.” (Interview with MP Nakagawa Hidenao, 
01 February 2011).
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to obtain Japanese nationality. He suggests that this can be paid for in part by redirecting Ocial De-
velopment Assistence funds to this purpose.9
In an interview with me (2009/11/05), Sakanaka commented on Ikuo Hirata’s Nihon Keizai Shimbun 
news article of September 28, 2009, remarking that this was just what Japan needed to convince the 
public of the importance of bringing immigration policy to the front stage of strategic planning for 
Japan’s future. He noted that several news articles in 2009 used the term imin (immigrant) rather than 
“foreign worker,” which he took as a sign that the media are coming around to the idea of immigration 
in Japan. He also mentioned that he is in favor of amnesty for Japan’s undocumented immigrants, 
whom he noted are only a very small number of people at any rate. Interestingly, Sakanaka remarked 
that one thing that would need to be changed for Japan to become an immigration nation is Article 
One of the Constitution, which states, “e Emperor shall be the symbol of the State and of the unity 
of the people.” One can only imagine the problems that would arise if someone were to attempt to re-
vise this Article.
7.3　DPJ
e Democratic Party, currently in power, issued its own dra statement on “Proposal Concerning 
the Foreign Worker Problem” in March of 2008 (MGRMSC 2008). It had created a team in 2006 enti-
tled the “DPJ Working Team on the Foreign Worker Problem.” e proposal is much less ambitious 
than that of the LDP team. First of all, it is limited to nikkeijin and foreign trainee policy issues, whom 
they refer to as “foreign workers;” this is not an immigration policy statement. Among their ideas are 
to reassess the current side-door labor policy for nikkeijin and instead establish a three-year limited 
term guest worker scheme for simple labor, crack down on exploitative employers in the trainee sys-
tem as well as among those hiring nikkei workers, and make certain that these workers are enrolled in 
health and employment insurance schemes. For nikkeijin workers, they advocate initially allowing 
them in to work as individuals for the rst three years, and only allowing them to bring in their fami-
lies aer that if they have met conversational Japanese language standards and if they send their chil-
dren to school, as well as have proof of paying taxes. In these cases they would be allowed “permanent 
resident” status. e proposal also advocates making schooling mandatory for the children of nikkeijin 
and providing more opportunities for their Japanese language acquisition. Last there is mention of dis-
patching bilingual policemen in cases where local people and nikkeijin have trouble, and to install 
training courses on basic social rules in Japan when foreigners enter the country or want their visas ex-
tended. ere is nothing in the proposal mentioning the economic threat of the low birth-rate society, 
or suggesting a large-scale opening of the country to immigration. Indeed the proposal, as its title sug-
gests, is limited to the “Foreign Worker Problem,” yet with no consideration of amnesty for the long-
term resident undocumented foreigner population. ere is also nothing in the 2010 DPJ Manifesto 
9 For an overview of this book’s policies, see Lawrence Repeta and Glenda S. Roberts (2010).
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regarding immigration policy. However, it is not the case that no one in the DPJ is sympathetic to such 
a policy. In 2003, for instance, the House of Councillors member Koji Matsui, together with six other 
politicians came out with a policy position paper entitled “oughts on Receiving 10 Million Immi-
grants,” wherein they suggest that foreigners would act as a “trigger to the economy.” ey proposed 
scrapping vague-sounding standards such as “highly educated” and “those with special skills,” in favor 
of making a concrete and clear vision to strategically bring in immigrants. ey also suggest that an in-
ux of foreigners would provide stimulation to Japan’s unproductive white collar workers (Matsui 
2010). Indeed MP Nakagawa suggested that he had worked with DPJ members when he made the 
2008 proposal, and that there are still politicians in the DPJ who desire a large-scale immigration poli-
cy, but in the current economy it would be impossible to make it happen.
7.4　Keidanren
In April of 2009, the Japan Business Federation, Keidanren, published a report entitled “Toward De-
veloping and Securing Competitive Human Resources” which featured a large section on policy rec-
ommendations for developing and retaining foreign talent (NKDR 2009). e section begins with a 
recognition of the ever extreme foreign competition, and urges that Japan must promote diversity in 
its economic society by incorporating diverse knowhow, values, and original ideas. e document lays 
out a design for bringing this to fruition. Promoting long-term residence of both those currently seen 
as being in professional and technical elds, as well as of those who have acquired a certain credential 
or skill, they called for a deliberation on a “Japanese Immigration Policy” (Nihon-gata imin seisaku) 
(NKDR 2009: 7). In this document, they proposed “three ideals” under which this policy should be 
carried out: 1) making a country where foreigners would want to reside long-term; 2) preparing for a 
system that would actually enable the long-term residence of foreigners; and 3) making the conditions 
for long-term residence transparent and stably implemented (NKDR 2009: 8).
To bring about the “Multicultural Coexistence Society,” they recommended carrying out a deter-
mined policy to admit greater numbers of foreigners, particularly those who could add plus alpha to 
Japan’s domestic industries, and they argued that these people would contribute to the sustenance and 
expansion of Japanese employment overall. ey acknowledged that there are those who advise cau-
tion about the negative eects of immigrant workers on the domestic labor market, so they recom-
mended keeping the burden on the employment status quo to a minimum by preparing an orderly sys-
tem of immigration.
e report proceeded with concrete plans to create an environment for bringing in foreign human 
resources, including rethinking the current residency credentialing system to make it more fair and 
transparent, making a residence and employment management system that is more thorough, provid-
ing a solid social security system, improving foreigners’ living environment including national scal 
support and coordination for JSL training and rental housing assistance, as well as international school 
subsidies, and the easing of necessary conditions for permanent residency. ey also recommended 
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the enactment of a basic law to promote a “multicultural coexistence society,” accompanied by a Cabi-
net level post for a Minister of Multicultural Coexistence Society (NKDR 2009: 13). Finally, it included 
a substantial section on strategies to bring in, train and hire more foreign students.
It is quite clear, and not surprising, that the main organization representing private sector business 
in Japan is calling for Japan to overhaul the current system and bring in foreign workers in substantial 
numbers with the expectation that they would make long-term contributions to society. e 2009 
statement is the most detailed I have seen yet, and it is based on surveys made of other countries’ sys-
tems of immigration.
7.5　Solidarity Network with Migrants in Japan
ere are also many civil society organizations in Japan working toward improving living and work-
ing conditions for foreign residents and lobbying the government actively to create what is called a 
“Multicultural Coexistence Society” (tabunka kyōsei shakai). Beginning with groups that supported the 
zainichi Korean “oldcomer” population and expanding to numerous support organizations for “new-
comer” foreigners living in Japan, they have proved essential in upholding the rights of the foreign 
population and contributing in crucial ways where government assistance was totally lacking (Roberts 
2003; Shipper 2005, 2008; Milly 2005; Yamanaka 2006). Many of these groups challenge the current 
immigration policy framework by, for instance, advocating that overstayers who have lived peaceful 
and productive lives in Japan for many years now, should be granted amnesty, or by insisting that the 
current technical trainee system is a sham and should be replaced by a system allowing migrant work-
ers to perform blue-collar work as regular workers under the Labor Standards Act (Torii 2006 and 
2011a and b; Nakajima 2006/11/07). Some write books to expose the scapegoating by politicians and 
media of foreign migrants as criminals (GSUN2004). Some oppose the new move toward heightened 
surveillance and control through ID cards (Nichibenren 2006). e citizens groups’ voices may lack 
the strength of the economic organizations, but they do maintain international networks and are savvy 
about using external pressure and human rights arguments to bolster their concerns. Of course these 
groups have dierences among themselves, and one cannot claim they pose a united front on all issues. 
One of the main groups is Solidarity Network with Migrants Japan (SMJ), a network consisting of civil 
society organizations and labor unions, formed in 1997. In 2009, they published a thick book of policy 
recommendations entitled e Future of a Multicultural Coexistence Society (SMJ 2009a). SMJ regular-
ly November 16 and 17, 2009, holds hearings with ocials of relevant government ministries on press-
ing issues currently facing migrant populations in Japan. While it is dicult to assess the extent to 
which this sort of hearing is eective in changing immigration policy, a bureaucrat at one such session 
in November 2009 remarked to me that such sessions were important to the ministries as they gave 
them crucial ground-level perspectives which they otherwise would lack. As Goodman (2008: 331) 
notes, “[…] migrant populations are themselves not passive in the face of state policies nor homoge-
nous in their reactions towards them.” As increasing numbers of migrants become permanent resi-
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dents and naturalized citizens, one can expect their participation in groups such as SMJ only to in-
crease.
8.　Aer the Great East Japan Earthquake
As one might expect, there has been little ocial movement on new migration initiatives since the 
Great East Japan Earthquake and nuclear disaster of March 11, 2011. e country has been consumed 
by issues of disaster relief, rebuilding, and energy policy. Mr. Sakanaka (2012) has published another 
book, Population Crash and the Immigration Revolution (Jinkō hakai to imin kakumei) and is busy pro-
moting it. He may have found an audience. Just recently in a press interview, the Cabinet Minister in 
charge of the low birth-rate policy, MP Masaharu Nakagawa, stated, “In reality, there are many foreign-
ers [living] in Japan as de facto immigrants. Now is the time we must debate the way to accept foreign-
ers [into the country].” He mentioned that countries such as the USA and in Northern Europe were all 
thinking of immigration policies, and that Japan should also consider such issues and think of what 
sort of nation Japan should be (Yomiuri Shimbun 2012/02/24). Immigrant support groups such as SMJ 
and Asian People’s Friendship Society were immediately active in helping support the people of the 
Tōhoku region aer the disaster (Torii 2012). eir visibility and strong support for the local commu-
nities in the region has underscored the presence of foreign residents in Japan.
9.　Conclusion
In this paper, aer presenting a brief picture of the make-up of foreign residents in Japan at present, 
I have discussed the challenges the coming demographic decline will pose to Japanese society, and how 
the topic is being approached by some important stakeholders. ere is some evidence that despite the 
recent economic downturn, “foreign workers” are beginning to be considered as a partial solution to 
demographic decline, although tentative calls for ‘debate’ as that issued by Minister Nakagawa (above)
hardly constitute a strong trend.
In its 2008 policy report, “Opening of the Country to Human Resources! Proposal for a Japanese-
style Immigration State,” the LDP project team notes that besides an immigration policy,
[…] the consensus of the people is necessary. What we seek more than anything else is the de-
termination (ketsui) and will (kakugo) to open the country to immigration. If we are welcom-
ing foreigners as immigrants, we must provide workplaces where they can work with security. 
It is necessary to reform the socio-economic system to make it responsive to the needs of im-
migrants. (NIKMPC 2008: 1)
When I met with Ippei Torii in 2009 (10/30), I asked him about this talk of consensus and will. His 
reply was that it is up to the government to make consensus by making good policy. By this he means 
policy that would recognize and legitimate all the immigrants who have already come in through vari-
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ous side and back doors all these years, while building for a secure future for those yet to come. at 
many have come into Japan despite the lack of an ocial immigration policy is evident. at a few 
people are entering through new agreements in nursing and care giving is also evident. at there is a 
dedicated coterie of activists supporting the human rights of migrants has been evident from the out-
set. What remains to be seen is whether or not and on what levels, all this adds up to making Japan a 
nation where the word “immigration” gains voice in the coming decades.
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